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THE IMPERSONAL
DECISION MAKER:
COURTS OF EQUITY
AND THE RIGHT-TO-
DIE CASES
PETER J. RIGA*
One of the most important elements of judicial decision-making of the
modern period is that of the impersonality of the decision itself. The judge,
it is said, does not and must not become emotionally or personally involved
in individual cases; he simply must apply the legal (and impersonal) rule
to "like cases." In this way, a legal consistency of judicial decisions results,
giving the law stability, predictability, and impartiality-all the products
of a stable, orderly administration of justice in society. The decision-
maker's impartiality stems from the belief that the results must be fair and
predictable for all cases of similar fact situations.
By making the decision-making process one of impersonal judgment,
however, the judge has become a technician and the law a process of
techniques for efficient results. The legal standard or rule is formulated,
while the essential function of law-to insure justice-is given only lip
service. The process does not demand a man who is wise or has a fine sense
of justice, but one who understands the intricate principles of procedure,
the technical workings of the law, the legal terminology, and the legal
reasoning to derive efficient solutions from set standards. Thus, law is
removed from the personal, the particularized and the concrete, so that
"like cases can be judged alike."' The persons of the law are thereby
masked by the application of the set rule which assures the law of its
"objectivity" and the problem of justice is no longer one of.its concerns. 2
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Lincoln University School of Law, San Francisco.
M.A., Louvain University, Belgium, 1954; M.S., Catholic University of America, 1961; M.A.,
State University of New York at Buffalo, 1965; Ph.D., Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley,
California, 1973; J.D., University of San Francisco, 1976; LL.M., 1978, J.S.D., 1979, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
See A Watchdog Panel Urged for Research, San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 18, 1978, at 18,
col. 1.
In the words of John Noonan:
The complex rationality of individuals escapes reduction. As long as it does, the ra-
tional rules which speak to them must address them as persons-that is, the rules must
be more than stimuli reaching a single locus in the brain, causing fear or inducing
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All of this functions well until, like the new life/death cases of In re
Quinlan' and Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,'
there are no precedents or set legal standards. Only then does the mask
drop and we are permitted to see the confusion, uncertainty and agony of
the decision-maker. Only then does the law attempt to do justice5 amidst
an ambiguous human situation where there is no clear-cut right or wrong,
black or white. Rather, there is an amalgam of grays.
"Objective" decision-making is the product of the development of law
in the United States which attempted to deal with a profoundly human,
moral and agonizing problem on the American scene: Slavery.' It is ironic
that modern American judicial decision-making had its origins and princi-
pal development in the defense of that inhuman American phenomenon.
Its residue is no less inhuman. Nowhere in the annals of American history
has the question of judicial discrimination been more torturous than in the
area of slavery. From almost the beginning, American jurists took their
essential teaching on the morality of slavery from Blackstone, who branded
it as against natural law.7 All the American jurists of the 18th and 19th
centuries held this view, almost without exception.' At the same time,
their analysis of the Constitution and laws of the United States led them
to uphold slavery as an institution in every major case of the period.?
pleasure; they must be capable of internalization as standards of conduct and as
directions to the achievement of human goods. They must teach more than they coerce.
J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw 164 (1976).
3 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (1975), modified, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied
sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
- Mass. - , 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
See Rothenberg, Demands for Life and Requests for Death: The Juridical Dilemma, at 2-8
(1978) (unpublished manuscript).
I For a fuller development of this, see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
Blackstone, in his Commentaries notes:
[P]ure and proper slavery does not, [nor] cannot, subsist in England; such I mean,
whereby an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life and
fortune of the slave. And indeed, it is repugnant to reason, and the principles of natural
law, that such a state should subsist anywhere.
II W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 423 (1915).
1 One of America's foremost jurists, Joseph Storey, often used his charges to juries to speak
out against the immorality of slavery and the slave trade. He then claimed that the only
policy consistent with "the spirit of the Constitution, the principles of our free government,
the tenor of the Declaration of Independence and the dictates of humanity and sound policy"
was for Congress to abolish slavery in the territories. See Salem Gazette, Dec. 10, 1819, at 3,
col. 1.
' See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). The Supreme Court's
decisions in Prigg and Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847), upheld the constitu-
tionality of the 1793 Act. It has been suggested that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was
"sufficiently different from the Act of 1793, which it amended." R. COVER, supra note 6, at
175. Interesting to note, however, is that Chief Justice Taney's majority opinion in Booth,
declaring the 1850 Act to be constitutional, is supported exclusively by authority relating to
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How can we account for this? How did an entire legal system uphold
an institution as vile as slavery, which was recognized as such by all the
major jurists of the slavery period, and conflicted with "higher law,"
"natural justice" and the "basic principles of government"T The funda-
mental conflict between some form of "higher law" and human positive
law has presented itself. This problem was not new to the 19th century,
however, since this argument was at least 500 years old when the American
debate over slavery first began." Nevertheless, the way it evolved in Amer-
ican life, aided and abetted by the American legal system, could only and
inevitably did lead to the tragedy which ensued.
Moral arguments, of course, are not and cannot be resolved legally or
politically; they belong to and are dependent on the moral sense of a
people. Only in this way can we begin to understand the fundamental
conflict and contradiction in the American legal and political system. The
moral cleavage in American society, which developed as a result of the
conflicting moral values embodied in the institution of slavery, became so
deep that it eliminated "the areas where the judge could move the law in
the direction of freedom.' 1 2 Ultimately, it became apparent to the judici-
ary that they must enforce the infamous Fugitive Slave Laws, not because
they were moral-the judges claimed not to be concerned about this in
applying the law-but because it was necessary to save the Union. 4
The situation grew even more difficult by the fact that it could no
longer be pretended after Dred Scott v. Sanford5 that the Constitution was
not pro-slavery. It was at least possible before that cataclysmic decision
to hold that, although slavery was a reality in certain parts of the Union,
the fundamental law was not pro-slavery. Now, the heart of judicial for-
malism was dead. This very idea was expressed by Justice McLean in his
the earlier Act. Id. at 187. See generally G. STRoun, SKrrcH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY
(1968).
10 This was long the argument of R. COVER, supra note 6. Cover's argument concerns the way
jurists dealt with the problem, whereas the focus of the present article is to trace the way
the conflict between "natural law" and "positive law" was finally resolved.
1 See Riga, Marsiglio of Padava: Father and Creator of the Modem Legal System, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 1421 (1978).
2 R. CovER, supra note 6, at 7.
" See the remarks of Justice McLean in his charge to the jury: "These laws [Fugitive Slave
Laws of 1793 and 1850] lie at the foundation of the social compact, and their observance is
essential to the maintainance of civilization. In these matters, the law, and not conscience,
constitutes the rule of action." Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 326 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850).
"1 It was Chief Justice Tilghman of Pennsylvania who was at the origin of the historical-
necessity thesis:
Whatever may be our private opinions on the subject of slavery, it is well known that
our southern brethren would not have consented to become parties to a constitution
under which the United States have enjoyed so much prosperity, unless their property
in slaves had been secured.
Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawl. 62, 62-63 (Pa. 1819); see note 9 supra. See also J. HURD,
THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 439 (1858).
11 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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dissent in Dred Scott.'0
The abolitionist view-in particular, the Garrisonian view" that radi-
cal dichotomy existed between natural and positive law, that the Constitu-
tion from beginning to end was a pro-slavery document, and that it was
in fine a compact with the devil-seemed much sounder after the Dred
Scott decision than in the mid-1840's when these sentiments were first
uttered. As the abolitionists clearly saw, however, it was the obligation of
the judiciary to faithfully execute the positive law and to disregard natural
law when it was in conflict with positive law. It was precisely this reasoning
which was followed by Story, McLean, Curtis, Shaw, Taney, and Mar-
shall; in short, all the prominent judiciary of the slave period. They could
morally maintain their position as long as they saw some hope in and for
the system. These jurists clearly recognized that the Constitution was a
compromise document over slavery which kept millions of human beings
in servitude." The Abolitionist Wendell Phillips pointed to five parts of the
Constitution which irrefutably demonstrated this belief: the three-fifth
clauses,''the prohibition on Congress for the slave trade until 1808,5 the
Fugitive Slave Clause,2" the clause affording Congress the power to sup-
press insurrection22 and the provision for Federal assistance in suppressing
domestic violence.' Both abolitionists and judges agreed that the Consti-
11 Id. at 529 (McLean, J., dissenting). State judges acknowledged this view as well. See Ex
Parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77, 228 (1859) (Brinkerhoff, J., dissenting).
'1 See the works of W. PmLLips, THE CONsTrruTON: A PRo-SLAvERY COMPACT (1844), where
he compiled all of the then available data on the intentions of the framers of the Constitution
with respect to slavery. It is ironic to note that Chief Justice Taney used precisely much of
the material contained therein to buttress his opinion in Dred Scott. Phillips went further
the following year. W. PHILLIPS, CAN ABoLrIToNIsTs VOTE OR TAKE OFFICE UNDER THE UNrrED
STATES CONSTrrUTION? (1845). Therein, he deals with the complicity of abolitionists in a
system which is basically corrupt and corrupting. Still one year later, Phillips destroyed the
arguments of Spooner who tried to show that slavery was contrary to the Constitution itself.
See W. PHILLPS, A.REVIEW OF LYSTANDER SPOONER'S UNCONSTITUTIONAuTY OF SLAVERY (1847).
Phillips also called for the resignation of anti-slavery judges. Yet, there is not one judge on
record who ever did. In any event, Dred Scott showed whatever judges remained to be
convinced that Phillips was correct and the moral question could no longer be avoided. The
ameliorist judges simply had nowhere else to turn except to resignation or revolution. The
legal system could no longer salvage their consciences.
11 It is remarkable that throughout the majority opinion of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott,
he never once refers to slaves as human beings, but only as beings. Thus, Taney considered
slaves "a subordinate and inferior class of beings," 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05, "beings of
an inferior order," id. at 407, "this unhappy race," id. at 409, "a class of being," id. at 416,
"a subject race," id. at 417, "free persons of color," id. at 421, and "property of the master
in a slave," id. at 451. As Justice McLean said in his dissent: "We need not refer to the
mercenary spirit which introduced the infamous traffic in slaves, to show the degradation of
negro slavery in our country." Id. at 537 (McLean, J., dissenting).
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
0 Id. § 9, cl. 1.
2 Id., art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
2 Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
23 Id., art. IV, § 4.
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tution was a bargain, a price to be paid for the resulting Union.24 Since the
judge was not -permitted to apply his own moral vision of natural right or
wrong with respect to slavery, however, the anti-slavery judge after Dred
Scott could not escape into an ameliorist position which was at least a
possibility before that landmark decision. To do otherwise, would violate
his "'paramount obligation'" as a member of the judiciary.15
I have stressed the example of slavery because it shows very clearly
the failure of legal formalism, of "objective," "rational" rule-making.
When confronted with a profound moral issue, as in the case of slavery,
the judges became technicians of the law because of intolerable moral
pressure. Natural law as well as the historical analysis of the common law,
wherein slavery had already been declared unlawful, were rejected because
it was necessary to conserve the Union. Thus, law became a set of technical
norms which judges applied to a mass of human beings because "they had
no choice"-they merely enforced law but did not make it. The demands
of the consciences of the judges became subordinated to normative proce-
dures since, otherwise, the Union would dissolve and disorder would be
rampant. The concepts of order and unity of the Union were substituted
for justice as the end and a judicial efficiency developed to meet the crisis.
Law now insured order instead of justice, and nowhere in the pages of
American history is the failure of "judicial rational decision-making" more
clear or more devastating than in the area of slavery.
Yet, it still must be explained why the personal element of cases is an
anathema to judicial formalism and its objective rationality. It might well
be because there is a chance for the fortuitous, a possibility of risk and
uncertainty, and the same consequences cannot be expected in all like
cases-the bane of judicial rationality.26 For that reason, it is deemed
advisable to enclose the judge in a maze of procedural and technical net-
works where the occasion for personal confrontation is minimal, where
justice is ignored, and order, rationality and predictability of results are
all assured. Law then assures efficiency since efficiency is order. Moreover,
because law is detached from justice (this necessarily follows from its
impersonality and "rationality"), it becomes an activity without end and
therefore without human meaning.Y Formalism and impersonal decision-
making have made a travesty of the traditional concept of law.28 Tradition-
ally, each person knew his place in society and functioned therein, and the
"W. PHILLIPS, THz CONsTIrTmON: A PRo-SLAVERY COPNCr vi-vii (1844).
W. PHILLIPS, A REVIEW OF LYSTANDER SPOONER'S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 15-17
(1847).
26 B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
We have indicated that formal legal reasoning is built on the model of modem science
("formalism") and, therefore, like science, must deal with the general and the abstract; to
deal with the individual and the specific opens itself to human meaning which is the very
heart of justice and particularly, of the life/death cases of incompetents such as Quinlan and
Saikewicz. This cannot be stressed too strongly in this article.
n See J. ELLuL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SocTY 292-300 (1964).
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law gave him the means of functioning in society and saw to it that he
fulfilled that function. But modern law no longer poses the problem of the
end, purpose and finality of man's function, since law no longer coordi-
nates man's functions in their relation to justice." In other words, the
moral foundation of law has been replaced by technique.
Modern medical technologies have thrust on the judicial decision-
maker a task for which he is now not prepared. The cadres of legal stan-
dards and rules serve well when the judge is dealing with antitrust, con-
tracts, commercial paper, probate, policies, torts, etc. This is less so in the
area of the criminal law where the face and story of the defendant are there
before him, but even here he is aided by a jury. It is the impersonal
judgment of the "community" which condemns or frees the man or
woman. On the other hand, there is no escape from the agonizing decision-
making of the judge in the area of medical technologies. The court can
attempt to allocate responsibility by setting up "hospital ethics commit-
tees," as the court did in Quinlan. 3 This dodges the issue, however, since
it is problematic, at best, as to what such committees are supposed to do
in the first place. In these cases, therefore, the impersonal legal standards
do not protect the decision-maker and his mask drops for a moment to
reveal the human confusion and agony of grappling with a concrete and
particular person because justice must be done hic et nunc. As John
Noonan has stated:
The paradigmatic form for law, trial in court, reinforces the necessity to exalt
the role of rule. In the paradigm, the judge hears conflicting parties and
decides upon the evidence which they present. The evidence is related to his
decision through his selection of a rule. If the judge looks at who the parties
are, he is not looking at the evidence. A judge who takes into account who
the parties are will favor one or the other. A biased judge is no judge at all.
If the judge looks at the rules, he is acting in accordance with the para-
digm, which requires two persons to be in controversy, and a third person,
who prefers neither, to decide. The judge indicates his impartiality, he proves
his good faith, by looking not at the persons but at the rule. The rule is
neutral, 'above' the contestants and the judge.3'
Or, in the words of the famous American jurist, Benjamin Cardozo, the
human elements of a case ought not to be considered by the judge since
the judge may lose respect and confidence by the reminder that he is
subject to human limitation. As a consequence, the judicial process must
be "coldly objective and impersonal. '3 2
It is remarkable how the cases dealing with the life/death issues of
medical technologies permit us to see this personal agony precisely because
the individual tragedy of this person here and now cannot be avoided.
Id. at 299.
3 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
" J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 15 (1976).
' B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
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There are very few legal standards to guide the judge-on which he could
"hang his hat"-as is so often the case in the vast majority of cases in the
American legal system. This was explicitly seen by Judge Markowitz in a
case involving the refusal of blood by a Jehovah's Witness, mother of six
children, after a caesarian section. Her husband sought an order from the
court for blood transfusion. The judge ordered the transfusion, but note the
agony:
Never before had my judicial robe weighed so heavily on my shoulders. Years
of legal training, experience and responsibility had added a new dimension
to my mental processes-I, almost by reflex action, subjected the papers to
the test of justiciability, jurisdiction and legality. I read [the Georgetown
case decided by Judge Wright] and was convinced of the proper course from
a legal standpoint. Yet, ultimately, my decision to act to save this woman's
life was rooted in more fundamental precepts.m
When he finally made the decision, he. stated:
I was reminded of 'The Fall' by Camus, and I knew that no release-no
legalistic absolution-would absolve me or the Court from responsibility if I,
speaking for the Court, answered 'No' to the question 'Am I my brother's
keeper?' This woman wanted to live. I could not let her die!"
There are many cases of a similar nature but I shall not burden the"
reader with a complete recitation of all the cases here.n Suffice it to say
that these cases show us the contrast between the general, impersonal,
legally rational process and its consequent procedures which shield the
judge from the existential and moral question and from the personal trage-
dies before the decision-maker for whom there is little legal and technical
cover. The traditional "objective" juridical norm and the personal demand
for justice hic et nunc are here in all their stark contrast. The specific,
individual and concrete human person is before the judge demanding not
just law but above all, justice. In fact, that is what courts of equity are all
about.
The modern decision-maker, as we have seen, attempts to be
"rational," "objective," and "detached" from the particularities of any
concrete case. Since many instances in medical technologies involve sub-
jects which are emotionally involved in one way or the other (doctors,
family, next of kin), it is believed that the rational and objective court
should make the decision to "unplug" the machines or to withhold treat-
Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 216, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450,
451 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
' Id., 267 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
11 For examples of cases where these issues are raised, see In re President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. President
& Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super.
227, 252, 348 A.2d 801, 815, modified, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 624,.273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1966). See generally Riga, Compulsory Medical Treatment of Adults, 22 CAT. LAw. 105
(1976).
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ment. Yet, the family's or next of kin's interests are conflicting. They
either stand to gain in some way or are emotionally distraught. The hospi-
tal or medical facility may wish to put its resources to "better" use.3 The
doctor may be either too involved emotionally with the patient or his
family or both, or he may simply wish to follow his own conscientious
dictates (which the family usually follows) so that he, too, cannot be en-
trusted with the decision." This leaves the only fair and objective decision-
maker, the court itself, who will decide by neutral principles and objective
facts what is to be done with and for the incompetent patient by the norms
of public law.u
This ethos of objectivity and rationality in the judicial process is an
offshoot of the rationality which science has introduced in modem society
and which has become all pervasive as a methodology. This rationality is
limited since it operates abstractly from concrete human existence and,
thus, is incapable of giving total human meaning to any set of facts. As
long as we conceive of law as technique for efficiency, or as a model built
on science, it has some usefulness. But if law is a search for justice and if
justice must always confront the particular, the concrete and the individ-
ual, then the traditional "objective" norms are painfully inadequate.
Judges, like doctors, are not machines and, although it maybe true
that "laws and not men" rule, it must not be forgotten that in the last
analysis men do rule, even when they rule within and through the frame-
work of the law. And since the application of impersonal standards of
judgment has as its object to guard against conflict of interests of the
parties involved, the judge, it is said, must banish all feelings and personal
involvement in the case before him. This problem becomes acute in the
compulsory medical treatment cases and in ordering or withholding treat-
ment for incompetents. The judicial decision-maker must not confuse his
personal feelings with the person of the defendant-patient. He must per-
form objectively, rationally, calmly, according to the norms of public law.
It is precisely here that we encounter the basic and fatal flaw of the
"rational" and "objective" decision-maker. The lack of that empathetic
quality which assures a humane and compassionate result leads to possible
brutalizing results. The "profession" of parenting, which is becoming fash-
ionable today, is a good example. Parenthood has developed into a profes-
sion with rules to be learned, experts consulted, and expertise to be devel-
N See - Mass. at - , 370 N.E.2d at 419 (testimony in the Saikewicz case by the
guardian ad litem in the case).
11 For a fuller analysis of the objective disabilities of these different groups, see Robertson,
Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213, 214-
17 (1975).
U Id. at 265-67. Although Robertson calls for objective standards and mandatory procedures,
nowhere in the article does he specify an adversary proceeding before a court of law. For a
more satisfying analysis in this respect, see Kindregan, The Court as Forum for Life and
Death Decisions: Reflections on Procedures for Substituted Consent, 11 SuroLK L. REv. 919
(1977).
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oped. The "good" parent does not confuse his interests with that of his
child but sees him "objectively" as an individual. Decisions are made in
the child's best interest when those objective norms are observed. This
view of parenting resembles that of the objective judge overseeing his peers
to achieve the goal of a standardized legal system. The "good" parent
behaves exactly like the "good" judge and can easily evaluate what a
"good" parent would do in a particular circumstance, as, for example,
whether a kidney donation should be made from one child to another, or
cosmetic and other non-lifesaving operations should be performed. The
whole process of parenting has become an objective enterprise with its own
rules and regulations by "experts."
The traditional legal rule, however, was originally premised on the
common sense observation that parents identified with their children in an
intensely emotional way and, therefore, could be expected to do what is
best for them. This trust has been turned on its head by the new
"objective" parenting and its consequent overview by courts and the state.
Now, the identification is deemed "bad," and parents can be more easily
overseen and checked by an "impartial" and "objective" court or state
agency which has in hand all the rules for "good" parenting. Outside
supervision-and second guessing-over parental decision-making is now
assured and courts are as capable as parents of insuring the best interests
of children. The bringing up of children in a diverse, multi-ethnic culture
has now been stripped of its diversity and a standardized sameness has
been superimposed by the bureaucratic state and the imperial judiciary in
the name of "objectivity."
The same can be said of modern medicine as well. It, too, has become
impersonal and objective as it follows a scientific rationality which has
come to dominate the whole field of the healing arts, in spite of proven
healing powers of non-medical healing, such as faith healing, laying on of
hands, acupuncture, diet holistic nutrition. The trouble with these healing
arts is that they cannot be controlled by the courts or by the medical
profession in an "objective" way. The traditional common sense approach
was that unless any of these "unscientific" healing methods were patently
injurious, people (and parents for children) had a right to choose them. In
point of fact, even though modern medicine has made some strides, most
historians and demographers now are inclined to believe that improve-
ments in diet, sanitation, and general standards of living, not improve-
ments in medical technology, account for the prolongation of life expect-
ancy since the 18th century. It is a medical myth that the decline in infant
mortality or increase in longevity is derived from improvement in medi-
cine, as shown by studies performed by eminent members of the medical
community itself." Since we know so little of what is conducive to "good
" See McKeown & Brown, Medical Evidence Related to English Population Changes in the
Eighteenth Century, 9 POPULATION STUDIES 119 (1955); T. McKEOWN, THE MODERN RISE OF
POPULATION (1976); Langer, What Caused the Explosion?, 24 N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS 3 (1977).
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health," observing self-restraint in forbidding any of these "cures," except
in the face of imminent injury, seems practical. In any event, only scien-
tific medicine is recognized as legitimate and imposed by courts in the
name of "objectivity."
Prescinding from this argument, the logical prolongation of the objec-
tive mind-set of scientific medicine is that of medical technology and the
dehumanized machine. But it is this very effort that has brought scientific
*medicine most of its criticism. It has become dehumanized and, while
helping the patient, it has forgotten the person. 0 The ultimate irony is that
it is this medicine which now seeks a solution to one of its basic moral
problems (depersonalization of the patient) by recourse to a court system
which prides itself on its impersonality, objectivity and rationality. It is
no wonder that we have a bitterly complaining Judge Markowitz who is
stuck with the moral question which all the others (family, medical person-
nel, hospital) refused to consider:
From the frequently recurring applications to the courts in instances similar
to the case at bar, it is evident that in the absence of protective legislation,
members of the medical profession, by their repeated insistence upon a writ-
ten release in any and all cases prior to operative procedures, in effect, com-
pel judicial intervention in matters when the necessity or value of a legal
opinion alone is highly questionable. Confronted by a situation such as this,
I am of the opinion that the time has come for courts to inquire where a
continued condonation of such action and where a continued assumption of
jurisdiction over such matters lead. Undoubtedly, physicians, surgeons and
hospitals, like judges, lawyers and others as well, are often faced with seem-
ingly irreconcilable demands and conflicting pressures. Philosophers and the-
ologians have pondered these problems, and, as is to be expected, different
groups evolved different solutions. Religious beliefs and doctrines, for exam-
ple, complicated equitable solutions sought by courts in blood transfusion
cases."
Thus, concludes Judge Markowitz, the courtroom is not the proper place
to resolve these problems:
It is regrettable that the court here is placed in the position of refusing, or
what to many may seem the refusal, to act in order to save a life or to
ameliorate suffering. The contrary is the fact. It is because of the court's deep
concern for [human] life and well-being that it is reminding those whose
responsibility it actually is, to act appropriately, not arbitrarily, and without
fear. 2
The judge then made the following suggestion: "[An appropriate study
should be made by members of the legal and medical professions, hospital
personnel, and the community in general, including its spiritual advisers,
40 See P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 239-66 (1976).
,1 In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 622-23, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 630 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966)
(emphasis in original).
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to consider problems akin to those raised by this application. Certainly the
social aspects of such problems far outweigh their legal implications."13
But this is not the solution at all since the problem affects modern
medicine as well as law and parenting. The solution lies not in more
"objective rationality" but rather in the development of greater personali-
zation. A series of experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram clearly
demonstrates this need."
Milgram's subjects were led to believe that they were administering
shocks of greater and greater strength to another person, the "learner," in
order to induce him to memorize certain word associations. Upon instruc-
tion from a laboratory technician, a great number of the subjects pro-
ceeded to generate shocks, which appeared to be strong enough to kill,
upon the learners. About two-thirds of the subjects so complied when the
learners were in another room; apparently, since the subjects could not
view the reactions of the control group, more subjects were willing to inflict
pain. Even when the learners were in view, however, one-third of the sub-
jects were still willing to obey the orders of a technician and inflict what
seemed to be lethal pain on those present. This is astounding evidence of
the potential brutality that may exist in some people and may manifest
itself even when it conflicts with their consciences.
We are not far removed in this experiment from the objective-rational
mind of the 19th century, precivil war judiciary, who were willing to inflict
utter degradation on human beings even when it conflicted with their
consciences because it was commanded by another-"the law." In believ-
ing that their actions did not belong to them, or belonged to "the law,"
judges acted like obedient subjects of the laboratory technicians in Mil-
gram's experiments. They became objective instruments (Aristotle called
slaves "animated instruments") and rule followers in order to quiet their
consciences which identified with the ones they hurt by their actions.
Thus, full-bodied flesh and blood people were simply not there: they were
"learners," just as Chief Justice Taney never referred to slaves in Dred
Scott as human beings but only as "degraded beings,"' 5 just as judges are
faced only with an anonymous "plaintiff" and "defendant" who are inter-
changeable with any other "plaintiff" and "defendant," and just as the
judge is fully interchangeable with any other "judge."
Thus, the subjects in Milgram's experiments, the medical personnel
who operate the medical machines and the judge who refers to the "rule"
for his decision, all share a common experience: no one accepts personal
responsibility for their actions, or feels another's pain as if it were truly
one's own. Government by laws and not by men reaches its culminating
irony and brutalization. The judges in Quinlan sought to evade personal
responsibility by purporting to solve the problem by having Karen Quinlan
43 Id. at 624, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (emphasis added).
" S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974).
'5 See note 18 supra.
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miraculously return and make her own decision. Of course, the reality was
that this was impossible. They could avoid the pain and the responsibility
for the decision when they pretended that nothing existed but the
"objective rule of law.""8
Thus, the conflict between traditional and reformist approach pro-
duces the great anxiety and turmoil which we see in the legal decisions
surrounding the life and death issue of the medical technologies. Perhaps
this is desirable since it forces the decisionmaker to find some legal objec-
tive norms while at the same time forcing him to look at the person who
comes before him in these momentous decisions. To choose one approach
over the other will not solve our problem. The confusion, turmoil and
anxiety brought about by these cases-on the part of doctors, judges, par-
ents and next of kin, among others-protects everyone, including the in-
competent patient. This makes for less efficient decision-making and some
disorder. But that is the crux of human existence, and when we encounter
and grapple with that, we are beginning to grapple with the essence of law,
which is justice. Although jurists do not like confusion and disorder be-
cause they have been schooled in the fundamental notion that the objec-
tive of law is order, the agony of these decisions is forcing jurists to come
back to the concrete, to the individualized, and finally, to a new concept
of what really exists, as well as the results of these decisions. The impulse
to bring legal rational order into the problem of the medical technologies
is not a solution but part of the problem itself since it has brutalizing
implications.' We should view that impulse, so common among doctors
and judges alike in their search for "objective rationality," with grave
suspicion because it leads to brutalization. Law is a general concept, but
justice is always personal and particularized.
" For a discussion of the reasoning of the Quinlan court, see Hyland & Baime, In re Quinlan:
A Synthesis of Law and Medical Technology, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 37 (1977); Cantos, Quinlan,
Privacy and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RuTGERs L. REv. 243 (1977).
" See generally Appel, Ethical and Legal Questions Posed by Recent Advances in Medicine,
205 J.A.M.A. 513 (1968); Gurney, Is There a Right to Die?-A Study of the Law of
Euthanasia, 3 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 235 (1972); Comment, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. REv.
654 (1970).
